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DRAWEE BANK LIABILITY
means of fulfilling the juvenile court philosophy is to introduce at
least minimal standards of substantive and procedural due process
into juvenile proceedings. Due process, used not merely as a defen-
sive, protective reaction against the procedural arbitrariness of the
juvenile system but rather as an affirmative tool, can be a positive
force because in perfecting the entire system of justice it cannot help
but perfect individualized justice for the child. Juvenile law must
not only be framed in wisdom but also properly administered, and
principles of due process must be the viable element in that proper
administration.
SARAH D. MoRRis
BANKRUPTCY - NOTICE TO DRAWEE BANK - JOINT
LIABILITY WITH PAYEE
Bank of Matin v. England, 385 U.S. 99 (1966).
Whether a bank should be held jointly liable with a payee for
honoring a bankrupt's check after the filing of a voluntary bank-
ruptcy petition but before adjudication of bankruptcy raises several
interesting questions. Complications arise when the bank has no
knowledge of the bankruptcy action. The United States Supreme
Court recently dealt with this enigma in Bank of Matin v. England.1
The Marin case arose out of the following circumstances. Matin
Seafoods delivered five checks to Eureka Fisheries between August
27 and September 17, 1963. On September 26, 1963, Seafoods
filed a voluntary petition in bankruptcy. Six days later, Fisheries
presented the checks to the Bank of Marin which handled Seafoods'
commercial account On the same day, John M. England was ap-
pointed trustee for Seafoods. Since the bank had no notice of the
1385 U.S. 99 (1966). The case initially posed an interesting standing question
since judgment had already been satisfied by the payee prior to the bank's appeal. How-
ever, the issue was quickly disposed of when the Court found that the bank was a proper
party since it was still liable in contribution to the payee. Hence, the controversy pre-
sented was not moot but rather valid within the meaning of the Constitution. Id. at
101.
Mr. Justice Fortas, in a separate dissenting opinion, argued that no real controversy
was presented to the Court. He contended that the trustee had no real interest since
he merely sought costs and that the bank's interest was negligible as a result of the
payee's prior payment of the judgment. In essence, Fortas believed that the trustee
had conspired with the bank to have an interesting question of law determined by the
Court, thereby resulting in the lack of a true adversary proceeding. Id. at 111-12. (dis-
senting opinion).
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filing in bankruptcy, it honored the checks upon presentment, and
on the following day, the bank was notified by mail of the bank-
ruptcy proceedings. The trustee instituted an action to require the
bank to pay a sum equal to the checks and, in the alternative, sought
relief from Eureka. The referee's determination of joint liability
was affirmed by both the district and appellate courts.2 In revers-
ing, the Supreme Court was faced with the task of analyzing the
Bankruptcy Act.3
Before discussing the Supreme Court's reasoning in support of
the bank's claim of non-liability, an understanding of the relevant
bankruptcy provisions is essential. The Bankruptcy Act of 1898
contained numerous ambiguities, particularly those involving the
point in time at which tide to property vested in the trustee. Under
this act, tide was vested in the trustee at the time of his appointment
or upon adjudication of bankruptcy,4 often leaving large time gaps
between the filing of the petition and the appointment of the trustee
or adjudication. During the interim, the insolvent party who re-
tained title to his property, was able to transact business.'
The courts resolved the time-lag defect in the statute by devel-
oping two theories: relation back and constructive notice. Under
the former, the courts ruled that once the trustee was appointed,
title related back to the filing of the petition.6 In the latter, the
filing of a petition was said to be a caveat of the bankruptcy pro-
ceeding to the creditors and the entire world.7 The courts, however,
2 Bank of Maria v. England, 352 F.2d 186, 187-88 (9th Cur. 1965), reVid, 385 U.S.
99 (1966).
3 30 Stat. 544 (1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C. §§ 1-1255 (1964).
4 Bankruptcy Act § 70(a), 30 Stat. 565 (1898). The act provided:
The trustee of the estate of a bankrupt, upon his appointment and qualifi-
cation, and his successor or successors, if he shall have one or more, upon his
or their appointment and qualification, shall in turn be vested by operation
of law with the title of the bankrupt, as of the date he was adjudged a bank-
rupt, except in so far as it is property which is exempt ....
5 The depletion of the bankrupt's assets reduced the creditors' probabilities of re-
covering on the debt if the insolvent party was subsequently adjudicated bankrupt.
Creditors who knew of the insolvent's financial condition were free to fight for prefer-
ential treatment by securing liens on the debt due them. Finally, damage was also done
to the insolvent where an unwarranted involuntary petition was filed since the confi-
dence of others in dealing with him was destroyed. 385 U.S. at 106-08 (dissenting
opinion); 4 COLLIER, BANKRuPTcY 5 70.03(5) (14th ed. 1964). Wilde, The Chan-
dler Act, 14 IND. L.J. 93, 133 (1938).
6 See Everett v. Judson, 228 U.S. 474, 476-79 (1913); 4 COLLIER, op. cit. supra
note 5, 5 70.66; Hearings Before the House Committee on the Judiciary, 75th Cong.,
1st Sess. 210-11 (1937) (statement by Mr. McLaughlin); McLaughlin, Aspects of the
Chandler Bill To Amend the Bankruptcy Act, 4 U. Cm. L. REV. 369, 382 (1937).
7Ibid. In the often-cited case of Mueller v. Nugent, 184 U.S. 1 (1902), the Court
said that a filing of a petition was a "caveat to all the world, and in effect an attachment
and injunction." Id. at 14.
1370
19671 DRAWEE BANK LIABILITY 1371
seemed to recognize the precarious position of the bank where suit
was brought when it had honored the payee's check without notice
of a subsequent filing of the petition. Instead of employing the
relation-back or constructive notice theories, the courts generally
found it more expedient to find the payee liable since the payee, and
not the bank, would profit from immediate payment by avoiding the
complications of filing a creditor's claim in bankruptcy.8
The Chandler Act of 1938, the most recent major amendment,
eliminated some of the earlier problems by codifying the relation-
back theory. Section 70(a) provides that tide vests in the trustee
immediately upon the filing in bankruptcy.0 If the transfer occurs
between filing and the appointment of the trustee, certain excep-
tions to this rule are set forth in section 70(d).1 Ostensibly, any
transfer after adjudication is invalid. Thus, unless the fact pattern
in Matin falls within an exception of 70(d), the bank must be liable
to the trustee. This is the position taken by Mr. Justice Harlan in
his dissenting opinion."2
The dissent's theory is strengthened by section 18(f)"3 of the
Bankruptcy Act which provides that the filing of a voluntary peti-
tion, as in Matin, is the equivalent of an immediate adjudication of
8 Citizea's Union Nat'l Bank v. Johnson, 286 Fed. 527 (6th Cir. 1923), where the
court stated, in discussing caveat and relation back:
Its effect would be that the bank could not protect itself against liability to
a trustee in bankruptcy subsequently appointed on account of payments made
in good faith in the regular course of business and in the ignorance of the
bankruptcy proceedings - except through the impossible course of keeping
itself advised, not only daily, but momentarily, of the filing of petitiots for
adjudication of bankruptcy .... In our opinion the bankruptcy works no
such result. Id. at 528.
See In re Zotd, 186 Fed. 84, 87 (2d Cir. 1911), where the court said that the caveat
doctrine was never meant to apply to a bank which honored checks without notice of
filing. See also Cunningham v. Lexington Trust Co., 259 Mass. 181, 156 N.E. 1
(1927). Contra, In re Howe, 235 Fed. 908 (D. Mass. 1916). Although often cited
to affirm the relation back theory, this case was a suit against the payee. The court
agreed that as between the bank and trustee, the bank might be protected by the agree-
ment "under which deposits are customarily made." Id. at 910.
9 52 Star. 840 (1938).
'0 Bankruptcy Act § 70(a), 52 Stat. 879 (1938), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 110(a)
(1964). See McLaughlin, supra note 6, at 375-83; Hearings Before the House Com-
mittee on the Judiciary, supra note 6, at 210.
"Bankruptcy Act § 70(d), 52 Star. 881 (1938), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 110(d)
(1964), which governs transactions occurring "after bankruptcy and either before ad-
judication or before a receiver takes possession of the property of the bankrupt, which-
ever first occurs."
12 385 U.S. at 105, 108-09.
1 Bankruptcy Act § 18(f), 73 Star. 109 (1959), 11 U.S.C. § 41(f) (1964). The
section explicitly states that "the filing of a voluntary petition... shall operate as an
adjudication with the same force and effect as a decree of adjudication."
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bankruptcy, thus foreclosing the application of the exception provi-
sions of section 70(d) which apply only to the interim between fil-
ing and adjudication. To substantiate his belief that no provision
of 70(d) was directed at the voluntary petitioner, Mr. Justice Harlan
argued that section 70(a) was enacted to protect debtors from un-
founded involuntary petitions which would have the unfortunate
effect of destroying their credit. 4 The net result is that any transfer
after the filing of a voluntary petition must necessarily be invalid;
hence, the dissent would have found the bank liable. This argu-
ment is strong and difficult to circumvent.
By avoiding statutory interpretation, the majority opinion in
Matin failed to meet the dissent's argument head on, reasoning in-
stead that the bank and the bankrupt are in a contractual debtor-
creditor relationship' 5 which runs until the bank is notified to
refrain from honoring the drawer's checks. 6 Thus, the bank's ob-
ligation is terminated only when the trustee, the possessor of the
bankrupt's rights, 7 notifies the bank of the bankruptcy proceed-
ing.'" The dissent's argument relative to the strict construction and
application of sections 70(d) and 18(f) were dismissed as being
superseded by equitable considerations.'
While the majority reached a just solution, its reasoning is, at
best, weak. In the only case on point since 1938, Rosenthal v.
Guaranty Bank & Trust Co.,2" local Louisiana newspapers had run
banner headlines about the bankruptcy of the local company's Mary-
land parent. Unlike the Supreme Court in Matin, the Rosenthal
court relied on exception section 70(d)(3)1 which permits a bona
fide good faith transfer after filing even where there is actual notice
of bankruptcy if it is believed that the petition is ill founded. The
court found that newspaper publication, since not always complete
and accurate, was not adequate notice.22 Reliance was also placed
on section 70(d)(5)2" which invalidates any act that hinders the
14 385 U.S. at 104, 108-09 (dissenting opinion).
15Id. at 101.
16 Ibid.
17 Zartman v. First Nat'l Bank, 216 U.S. 134, 138 (1910); Hewit v. Berlin Mach.
Works, 194 U.S. 296, 302 (1904).
18 385 U.S. at 102.
19 Id. at 103.
20 139 F. Supp. 730 (W.D. La. 1956).
21 Bankruptcy Act § 70(d)(3), 52 Stat. 881 (1938), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 110
(d)(3) (1964).
22 139 F. Supp. at 735.
23 Bankruptcy Act § 70(d)(5), 52 Star. 881 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 10(d)(5) (1964).
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negotiability of currency or negotiable instruments. The Rosenthal
court found that this provision was meant to apply to banks in such
situations, whereas the Matin dissent found the provision inappli-
cable since their understanding of the Uniform Commercial Code
presupposes that a transfer is only valid upon presentment, and this
would occur after the voluntary petitioner has been adjudicated
bankrupt by his filing. Furthermore, the dissent argued that a pre-
sentment is not a negotiation. 5
With scanty precedent to rely on, the Marin Court was forced
to strengthen its decision through a due process argument. Prop-
erty in the possession of the bank, the Court implied, could not be
taken without violating the due process clause of the fifth amend-
ment unless notice was first given2 The test to be applied, as
found in Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 7 is that
notice must be 'reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances,
to apprise the interested parties of the pendency of the action."2
Why the Court was forced to go beyond the Bankruptcy Act to
fathom a due process guarantee seems strange indeed. It would
appear highly unlikely that the drafters overlooked or intentionally
failed to provide for such an important constitutional requirement.
In fact, the drafters of the act did require notice in two bank-
ruptcy provisions. The first calls for publication of notice to credi-
tors within ten days after the trustee is appointed.29 The second,
and more important, is the exception provision 70(d) (3) 0  Yet
it is readily evident that the first provision fails as a basis for pro-
tecting the payee and only by a very liberal construction, as in
Rosenthal, could section 70(d) (3) afford the intended bar to lia-
bility.
Seemingly, a stronger presentation may effectively be made for
a due process requirement which is more closely aligned to the
Bankruptcy Act, although not expressly found within it. This
would necessitate a distinctively different interpretation of the vol-
24 139 F. Supp. at 736.
25 385 U.S. at 104 & n.2.
26 Id. at 102.
27 339 U.S. 306 (1950). Here the court found that a New York statute which pro-
vided for notice by publication was inadequate as to trust-fund beneficiaries whose
whereabouts were unknown when the trustee intended to settle accounts.
28 Id. at 314. The Marin court cites this passage, 385 U.S. at 102.
29 Bankruptcy Act § 58(a), 52 Stat. 867 (1938), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 94(a)
(1964).
30 Bankruptcy Act 5 70(d)(3), 52 Stat. 881 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 110(d)(3) (1964).
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untary filing section 18(f)"' and of the negotiability provisions in
section 70(d)(5)."2  The sole congressional purpose behind amend-
ing section 18(f) in 1959 was to "eliminate the administrative bur-
den upon district judges imposed by the present requirements for
adjudication and reference in bankruptcy cases,""3 thereby eliminat-
ing the formality and congestion caused by requiring judges to sign
the voluntary petition. The apparent purpose of this section, was
therefore in no way related to the problem of vested title as had
been section 70(a)."4 This conclusion is bolstered by the fact that
section 18(f) is located within the chapter on the creation of the
bankruptcy courts and their jurisdiction.
Congress may well have assumed that no problems would arise
where the petition was filed voluntarily. Alternatively, Congress
may have intended the exception section 70(d) to apply to volun-
tary as well as involuntary proceedings should any problems arise,
thus obviating enactment of an identical provision in 18(f). In
fact, section 70(a), by its very language, makes no reference to either
voluntary or involuntary petitions, hence leaving an avenue open
for application of the equitable results found in section 70(d). If
the Matin dissent is correct in asserting that section 70(a) was meant
to apply to involuntary petitions only, why then was Congress not
explicit in drafting the act? Indeed, section 18(f) may be of ques-
tionable constitutional validity since its full effect is to delegate a
non-delegable judicial function to an administrative officer.
Assuming that section 70(a) has applicational validity to the
voluntary filer, exception section 70(d)(3) which deals with notice
could then be utilized. More importantly, section 70(d)(5), which
prohibits the impairment of the "negotiability of currency or nego-
tiable instruments,"3 could be applied. Since federal law does not
encompass the law of negotiable instruments, it is quite likely that
the courts would look to the Uniform Commercial Code which has
31 Bankruptcy Act § 18(f), 73 Stat. 109 (1959), 11 U.S.C. § 41(f) (1964).
32 Bankruptcy Act § 70(d)(5), 52 Stat. 881 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 110(d)(5) (1964).
332 UNITED STATES CODE CONGRESSIONAL & ADMINISTRATIVE NEWS 1571
(1959).
84 This section states:
The trustee of the estate of a bankrupt and his successor or successors, if
any, upon his or their appointment and qualification, shall in turn be vested
by operation of law with the title of the bankrupt as of the date of the filing
of the petition initiating a proceeding under this title. Bankruptcy Act §
70(a), 52 Stat. 879 (1938), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 110(a) (1964). (Em-
phasis added.)




been adopted by most of the states. Under the Code, the initial
issuance of a negotiable instrument, or the issuance of a check from
a drawer to a payee, is a delivery to a holder8" and not a negotia-
tion. Similarly, presentment by the payee to the drawee bank is
not a negotiation, a negotiation being a special kind of transfer by
a holder." Thus, in a technical sense, the Marin dissent is correct
in asserting that the transaction involved was not a negotiation.
However, the Marin fact situation does involve a negotiable instru-
ment. It is submitted that section 70(d)(5) was meant to apply to
all transactions concerning negotiable instruments and not merely
those concerning technical "negotiation," since its underlying policy
appears to be to promote circulation. Failure to protect a transac-
tion involving only a drawer, payee, and drawee defeats that pur-
pose.
The Uniform Commercial Code, in covering the entire spectrum
of negotiable instruments, regulates the relationship between the
bank and its customer. The Matin Court might have considered two
important sections which govern notice. Section 4-403 permits a
customer to stop payment if he gives the bank a reasonable oppor-
tunity to act. In conjunction with the above, section 4-303, which
the Code comment indicates has direct application to a drawer when
he has filed a bankruptcy petition, provides:
(1) Any knowledge ... for] notice ... to terminate... [or]
suspend ... the bank's ... duty to pay an item ... comes too late
to so terminate... [or] suspend ... such... duty if the knowl-
edge ... for] notice . . . is received or served and a reasonable
time for the bank to act thereon expires or ... after the bank has
done any of the following:
(a) accepted or certified the item.38
In the final analysis, there are many problems in the Bank-
ruptcy Act yet to be solved by Congress."9 Although the courts can
seek justice for all parties by adjudicating these controversies in an
386 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CoDE 3-102(a) [hereinafter cited as UCC].
37 UCC § 3-504 (presentment); UCC § 3-202 (negotiation).
38UCC § 4-303.
39 Many other problems concerning the Bankruptcy Act have arisen over the years,
especially in regard to creditor preferences. Other difficulties arise when the parties
find themselves in situations like that of the bank in Marin. For example, there may
be an employer who, without notice, has payed wages to his employee. Likewise, the
insurance company may pay the beneficiaries, after which the trustee may seek to re-
cover funds. For an interesting note on legislation proposed by the insurance lobby,
see 65 MicFi. L Rv.m 195, 200 n.33 (1966).
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